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Throughout the Illinois Budget Policy Toolbox, some 
analysts have described the depth of the financial 
crisis now facing the state of Illinois, while other 
analysts have laid out a variety of revenue and 
spending “tools” to address this crisis. So why do 
we continue to be in such a mess? Why can’t state 
policymakers simply pick up some of these tools and 
fix our problems?
To help answer this question, we can look at the 
politics of the state’s budgetary process in at least two 
respects. First, the Toolbox paper by Brian Gaines 
examines public opinion on various approaches to 
dealing with Illinois’ budget crisis.1 Second, in this 
paper, I analyze the politics of the process from that 
the perspective of interests and groups. 
1Gaines, Brian. (2014). Public opinion and political viability. The 
Illinois Budget Policy Toolbox. University of Illinois Institute of 




State budget-making is nothing if not political, but 
not just in the sense of political parties opposing each 
other. If only it was that simple, budget-making would 
be relatively easy. No, budgetary politics are often as 
complex and obscure as anything ever found in the 
Byzantine Empire. At root, these politics are based on 
interests—who gets what and who pays for what.
Everyone has a multitude of overlapping interests 
in the budgetary process. For example, among other 
things, I have interests in the Illinois budget as an 
employee of the state, as a taxpayer and as a user of 
state highways, state parks, and other state services. 
The way the budget is shaped affects each of these 
interests, often in conflicting and complicated ways.
Groups of like-minded people often work together in 
politics. Political parties are groups of people whose 
goal is to win elections and put their co-partisans 
into office. They often use policy positions and 
accomplishments as tactics for achieving this goal, 
but they ultimately seek office for their members. On 
the other hand, a group of people sharing the same 
interest—what political scientists call an “interest 
group”—can also be involved in politics. But the goal 
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of an interest group is to achieve policy in line with its 
members’ common interests. An interest group may 
get involved in elections tactically so as to pursue the 
policies it wants, but its ultimate goal is always policy. 
In this paper, I discuss interest-based politics to help 
understand budget politics.
  
Narrow vs. broad interests
Policy interests can be sliced and diced several ways. 
Mostly generally, budget politics are driven by the 
tension between narrow and broad interests. 
One manifestation of this tension is familiar to every 
observer of state government—the difference between 
the interests of each legislative district and the interests 
of the state as a whole. State senators represent only 
218,000 people, and state representatives only 114,000 
people, out of a state of 12.9 million. As a result, the 
interests of a district that includes Rock Island County 
in the northwestern of the state may be very different 
than one that includes Saline County in the south or 
some piece of Chicago. Not only do people in these 
different parts of the state have different politics, they 
want and need different things from the state. For 
example, needs regarding “transportation policy” 
may involve interstate highways and freight rail lines 
in Rock Island, farm-to-market roads in Saline, and 
mass transit in Chicago. Balancing these transportation 
needs in the budget is no mean feat. 
But if each region got as many state dollars as it wanted 
for education, public safety, and other spending 
categories, and even if these didn’t conflict with one 
another, the result would lead to major budget bloat, 
overspending, and unpaid bills. This outcome would 
hurt the broader interests of the state by damaging 
the state’s credit rating, making it less attractive 
for business relocation, and crippling its ability to 
recruit the best and the brightest people to work in 
public service. In this way, the narrow interests of the 
individual regions can conflict with the broad interests 
of the state as a whole.
This narrow-vs.-broad interest tension is clearly on 
display in conflicts between the legislature and the 
governor. Legislators are elected only by voters in 
their districts, so they typically pursue those regional 
interests. The governor has a statewide constituency, 
so he or she has the incentive to pursue the interests 
of the state as a whole. This is not to say that the 
governor’s perspective is right and the legislature’s is 
wrong. They just have different interests, and they act 
to pursue them accordingly. 
Advocacy groups and interests
This tension of interests plays out in another even 
more pervasive budgetary context—the mobilization 
of advocacy groups. Political economist Mancur 
Olson argued that a fundamental mismatch arises 
between the organizational ability of narrow and 
broad interests.2 He attributed this problem to the 
“logic of collective action.” Interests gain political 
power from organization and mobilization. They do 
this, for example, by hiring a lobbyist, developing 
a consciousness of shared interest among group 
members, and inspiring those members to act in the 
political arena. 
Do narrow or broad interests have an advantage 
here? On the one hand, you might think that broad 
interests would be advantaged. After all, more people 
having an interest means more political clout. But on 
the other hand, remember that people have a variety 
of overlapping and competing policy interests. As a 
result, a person might ignore some minor interests 
in the pursuit of his or her other, more important, 
interests.
For example, suppose the dairy industry proposes a 
$.05 tax on each gallon of milk to finance research on 
how to increase milk production. Every Illinois milk 
drinker would have an interest in opposing that tax, 
even if that interest was very small—a nickel per gallon 
would hardly be noticed. But the state’s relatively 
few milk producers would have a very strong and 
common interest in passing this bill since it could 
increase their profitability. Because their common 
interest on this tax is so strong, milk producers might 
start up the Illinois Milk Producers Association, hire 
a lobbyist, and get busy at the statehouse to pass it. 
Yet consumers would have no major incentive for 
the mobilization of a parallel Illinois Milk Drinkers 
Association, nor lobbyists in opposition to the tax. 
Interest politics and the state budget crisis
How does this dynamic affect Illinois policymakers’ 
ability to solve our budget problems? First, it causes 
the state to overspend on narrow interests and 
underspend on broader interests. Broader interests 
simply have less mobilized and organized support. 
One of the most important broad interests of all 
Illinoisans is to get our state’s fiscal house in order. 
But to do that, many narrow interests would have to 
be hurt. And those narrow interests will be pursued 
2Olson, Mancur. (1971). The logic of collective action. Rev. ed. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
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with greater vigor than broader ones like fiscal 
responsibility.
Consider this example. It has to do with taxing rather 
than spending, but the principles are the same for 
each side of the ledger. The state currently imposes 
a 6.25 percent sales tax on the purchase of general 
merchandise, which is “most tangible personal 
property.” So if you buy a $100 alternator for your 
car, you’ll pay the state $6.25 of sales tax. But many 
services that people buy are not subject to the sales 
tax in Illinois because they are not “tangible personal 
property” (even though they are subject to a sales 
tax in many other states). So if you took your new 
alternator to a mechanic in Illinois to install it for $100, 
you wouldn’t pay any sales tax on the installation. 
But now consider a revenue-neutral “tax reform” 
proposal to broaden the sales tax base in Illinois to 
include services and to reduce the overall sales tax 
rate.3 Economists assure us that this reform would be 
in the broad interest of Illinoisans because it is more 
efficient, fairer, and leads to less tax avoidance (like 
you driving from Quincy to Palmyra, MO, where the 
sales tax on your alternator would be only $4.23). If 
the sales tax in Illinois was broadened and the rate 
reduced to at or below that of Missouri, there would 
be no incentive to make the purchase in Palmyra.
But who would advocate for that broad public good? 
If you save only $2.02 on your alternator by driving 
all the way to Palmyra, how much would you care? 
Would you contribute resources to start an interest 
group that would advocate for this reform? For 
individual consumers, this interest isn’t large enough 
to activate them politically.
But your car mechanic has a very powerful, narrow 
interest to oppose the broadening of the sales tax base 
to include her services, so she has a good reason to 
get mobilized. Not only would she have to collect 
and report those additional taxes (a big hassle), her 
services become more expensive, which might reduce 
business. Multiply the new sales tax you would pay 
on your repair by her hundreds or thousands of 
customers every year and you can see the impact such 
a policy decision would have on her and on every 
other car mechanic. Add all the dry cleaners, barbers, 
massage therapists, and many other service providers 
in the state who would be narrowly affected, and you 
3Giertz, J. Fred. (2014). The sales tax.The Illinois Budget Policy 
Toolbox. University of Illinois Institute of Government and 
Public Affairs. Available at http://igpa.uillinois.edu/budget-
toolbox/content/sales-tax.
can imagine the strength of the political mobilization 
against the broadening of the sales tax base. 
The politics of the budgetary process
Comparing the politics of budget proposals that 
affect narrow and broad interests is instructive for 
understanding why Illinois is facing its current fiscal 
crisis and why it will be so hard to extricate itself from 
this predicament.
Consider a proposal that impacts very broad interests, 
such as a general increase in the income tax or an 
across-the-board cut in spending. Such a change could 
have a big impact on the state’s overall fiscal health, 
but probably only a small impact on the budget of any 
individual household or firm.  
The groups that may have an interest in getting 
involved with such issues are those with the most 
general remit, such as umbrella groups like the Illinois 
Chamber of Commerce or the AFL-CIO. Likewise, 
the two political parties may pick up on this sort of 
issue so as to appeal to their broad constituencies and 
to differentiate themselves from their counterpart. As 
a result, broad interest issues often become polarized 
along party lines. While the impacts for individuals 
would be small, the breadth of such a change also 
often attracts wide media attention, so the fights over 
these issues are often played out in public. And since 
they are so public, individual legislators are afraid to 
misstep on these issues for fear of a “bad” campaign 
flyer being used against them in the next election. 
This fear further heightens the partisan nature of 
these battles, as party members flock together for 
political safety. Because of this dynamic, these broad 
interest issues are typically “kicked upstairs” for 
legislative leaders and the governor to hash out. 
Strong leadership is needed to overcome any broad or 
partisan opposition. As such, these are the issues that 
can define a gubernatorial administration—for good 
or ill.
On the other hand, budgetary proposals that are 
narrower in scope typically generate a very different 
type of politics. A proposal to broaden the sales tax to 
services or to cut spending to schools could be viewed 
as an attack on a relatively narrow interest. Of course, 
many budget policy changes are much narrower in 
scope, such as a new tax or fee on a particular industry 
or a targeted cut on an industry’s subsidy. And the 
politics of such narrow interest changes often exhibit 
the following particular characteristics.
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Narrow-gauged budgetary proposals can cause 
significant losses for a relatively small group of people 
or firms, so these proposals inspire the mobilization 
of politically active interest groups among those 
who would be hurt by them. So the Illinois Retail 
Merchants Association or even the Illinois State 
Bowling Proprietors Association might become 
active in fighting a broadened sales tax base. Broader 
interests that stand to gain by such changes would be 
less likely to get involved or even to organize at all. 
Interests on these issues often cross party lines, as a 
person from either party could own a bowling alley. 
Thus, the parties themselves tend to stay out of these 
fights. Due to the often narrow and arcane nature 
of these changes, the media and general public tend 
to ignore them. Likewise, governors and legislative 
leaders have more important things to do than to get 
involved, except perhaps tactically on occasion. Thus, 
the politics of these issues is very “inside baseball,” 
with lobbyists for each side working quietly in the 
capitol halls to carve out an advantage for the narrow 
interests they represent. For example, the lobbyist 
for the Illinois State Bowling Proprietors Association 
might work tirelessly to get bowling alleys exempted 
from any broadened sales tax. This effort would have 
a minor budgetary impact, so keeping the issue quietly 
behind the scenes helps the bowling alleys. Besides, 
the media, governor, and legislative leaders will not 
have time to track this minor issue.
Conclusion
Understanding the political dynamics inherent in 
the budgetary process helps us understand better 
the current fiscal crisis facing the state of Illinois and 
why solving it is so difficult. Narrow interests are 
advantaged in the budget process, and broad interests 
are disadvantaged. It is easier to pass a minor bill that 
helps a narrow set of firms or people than it is to pass 
a major bill that addresses broader public problems. 
And an accumulated endless number of narrow 
interests is often quite detrimental to the common 
good of the state. So if the milk producers and the 
bowling alleys and the dry cleaners each get just a little 
piece of the pie, the burden on the average taxpayer 
is overwhelming. But the average taxpayer—and the 
broad interest of the state—have little incentive to 
organize and represent themselves in Springfield. That 
is the role of our elected officials, but they are often 
seduced by the narrow interest forces, since these are 
the ones that they hear from most frequently and with 
the most urgency.
In short, editorial writers and pundits like us can easily 
argue for the broad public good, but when their ox is 
being gored, each of them will fight for their narrow 
interests. Just ask the editorial writers what they 
would think about a tax on printer’s ink and newsprint 
to help balance the budget. Or ask us academics what 
we think of cutting state support of higher education.•
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